The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Comments on the Agency and its Role in Employment Discrimination Law by Lynch, Mary Kathryn
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION:
COMMENTS ON THE AGENCY AND ITS ROLE IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
Mary Kathryn Lynch*
I. INTRODUCTION AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the
federal agency primarily responsible for administering and enforcing
the major federal statutes prohibiting various forms of discrimination
in employment. These statutes are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII),1 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), 2 the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA),3 and section 501
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
4
* Senior Trial Attorney with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). This article was written by Mary Kathryn Lynch in her private capacity.
No official support or endorsement by the EEOC or any other agency of the United
States Government is intended or should be inferred.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, et seq. (1988)). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including sexual harassment
and, since 1978, pregnancy), or national origin. Title VII also prohibits retaliation
by employers or unions against employees, applicants, members (in the case of
unions), and, in some cases, ex-employees for opposing any discrimination or par-
ticipating in the Title VII processes. Moreover, Title VII applies to foreign employers
doing business in the United States, subject to treaties providing otherwise. Some
courts have ruled that the act also covers United States citizen employees of United
States companies operating abroad.
I Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)).
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) prohibits discrimination
in employment against persons aged 40 and over. Generally, absent a treaty with
contrary provisions, the ADEA applies to employees of foreign firms operating in
the United States as well as to United States citizens working for United States firms
or United States controlled firms located outside the United States.
I Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 26(d) (1988)). The
Equal Pay Act of 1963, enacted as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, prohibits discrimination in pay on the basis of gender. It covers only those
employees working within the United States.
4 Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 501, 87 Stat. 355, 390 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 79
(1988)). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled by federal
employers. The EEOC has some interpretive and review authority for section 501
of the Rehabilitation Act. Other functions are administered by the Department of
Labor.
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The EEOC and the anti-discrimination legislation administered by
the agency have significantly altered the nature of employment in the
United States. 5 The legislation enforced by the EEOC affords broad
rights and remedies to employees which they would not have oth-
erwise. For many employees, the modern discrimination statutes are
the sole protection against a system of employment at will and work
places in which discrimination is practiced.
Further, in the interest of affording United States citizens the same
protections abroad as they have in the United States, a number of
the anti-discrimination laws have been given extraterritorial appli-
cation. This situation has led to conflicts of jurisdiction and potential
problems for American companies operating overseas. In a 1984
amendment to the ADEA, Congress extended the protections of the
ADEA to United States citizens working for American companies
abroad. However, Section 4(f)(1) of the Act contains a "foreign
laws" defense which provides that actions otherwise prohibited under
the Act shall not be unlawful if compliance with the ADEA's pro-
visions "would cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by
such employer, to violate the laws of the country in which such
workplace is located." '6
Moreover, there is a current of opinion that would also afford the
protections of Title VII to United States citizens working for American
companies abroad. However, Title VII does not specifically address
the issue. Most courts which have considered the question have ruled
in favor of or have simply assumed such jurisdiction. 7 However, a
recent en banc majority decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Boureslan v. Aramco8 held that Title VII did not have extrater-
ritorial effect. The EEOC had intervened in the Boureslan case and
It should also be noted that Congress recently passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1989. Under this Act the EEOC is the enforcing body and will
follow the procedures and remedies of Title VII. The Act prohibits discrimination
in private employment, public accommodations, state and local government services,
transportation, and telecommunications against individuals with disabilities. The
legislation will become effective two years after signature by the President. It is
estimated that the legislation will cover 3.9 million business establishments and
666,000 employers. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1989, at E5, col. 1.
6 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
7 See Bryant v. Int'l Schools Serv., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D. N.J. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds 675 F.2d 562, 577 n.23 (3rd Cir. 1982); Seville v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986); Love v. Pullman Co., 13 FEP 423, 426
n.4 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978).
8 892 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1990).
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argued in favor of finding jurisdiction. The Court emphasized the
right of nations to regulate conduct within their own borders which
it said is a "fundamental concept of sovereignty that is not lightly
tossed aside." 9 According to the Court, this concept had given rise
to a presumption against extraterritorial application of a statute. The
Court concluded that nothing in the language of Title VII indicates
that Congress intended to override this presumption. Also, a legal
advisor to the State Department has recently advocated a more cau-
tious approach to the extraterritorial application of Title VII than
that advocated by the EEOC.' 0 United States companies with overseas
operations are also concerned about extraterritorial jurisdiction and
the specter of dual liability under Title VII and the law of the other
countries in which they conduct business.
Similar concerns about conflicts of jurisdiction and dual liability
present themselves when non-United States companies operating in
this country are subject to the anti-discrimination statutes. A recent
General Counsel of the EEOC expressed the view that foreign gov-
ernments and employers have claimed too much protection under
their treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation." The Su-
preme Court recently refused to intervene in a job bias lawsuit filed
against Korean Air Lines.12 The Court's action let stand a Third
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that the 1957 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation did not grant the Korean air line blanket
immunity from American labor laws. 3 The Third Circuit concluded
that the treaty gives companies the right to engage executives "of
their choice" and permits intentional discrimination based on citi-
zenship, but not upon race, age, or national origin. 14
Because of the central role and broad scope of the anti-discrimi-
nation statutes, employees, United States and foreign employers, and
foreign governments have reason to familiarize themselves with these
laws. Affirmative duties, including reporting requirements, are im-
9 Id. at 1272.
1o See Comments of Ted A. Borek of the State Department's Office of Economic,
Business, and Commercial Affairs, in Attorneys Debate Wisdom of Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Fair Employment Statutes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 206,
at A-3 (Oct. 26, 1989) [hereinafter Attorneys].
1 See Comments of Charles A. Shanor, General Counsel, EEOC, in Attorneys,
supra note 10.
12 Korean Air Lines v. MacNamara, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 349 (1989).
11 Id. at 1147.
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posed upon employers subject to these acts. In addition, violation
of the statutes can be costly. While the design of most of the legislation
and the role of the EEOC in enforcing the laws is to effect voluntary
compliance, the EEOC has found litigation to be an important tool
in achieving its congressionally mandated goal of eliminating dis-
crimination in employment and remedying the unlawful effects of
discrimination which is uncovered. Over the years, the EEOC, through
its conciliation and litigation actions, has secured millions of dollars
in monetary benefits and other affirmative relief for victims of dis-
crimination in employment.
Critics of the EEOC fall into two camps. Some critics maintain
that the Agency's investigative powers are too broad and that these
powers and the discrimination laws have spawned too much litigation.
Others argue that the Agency and the laws that it enforces are not
powerful enough, that the Agency's procedures are too complex, and
that the Agency's time limitations are too restrictive. Major changes
have been proposed and will be discussed below. In an attempt to
present an overview of the EEOC and its functions, this paper will
serve as a commentary on the Agency, its administrative procedures,
and its role in eliminating employment discrimination.
II. THE EEOC
The EEOC was created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and became functional in July of 1965.11 Enactment of the Civil
Rights Act followed many years of effort. State laws prohibiting
discrimination had already emerged but provided only a piecemeal
array of rights and remedies for employees, depending on where they
happened to work. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (part of
the Reconstruction Era statutes), including Section 1981, was assumed
to apply only to government action. Not until 1968 was this statute
held to apply to private conduct. Since that time, Section 1981 has
been used extensively to fight discrimination in employment. However,
Section 1981 in general applies only to race and alienage and requires
the initiation of court action. Section 1981 is currently codified in
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
With the increasing violence that surrounded the early days of the
civil rights movement in the United States, particularly in Birmingham
11 The EEOC has approximately 48 field offices (23 full service district offices,
16 area offices, and 9 local offices) located throughout the United States. The
Agency's fiscal year 1990 appropriation has been set at $184.9 million.
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in May of 1963, support for federal civil rights legislation grew. The
Kennedy administration submitted a draft of a civil rights bill in June
of 1963. After President Kennedy's assassination, President Lyndon
B. Johnson gave the civil rights legislation great priority. The Senate
approved its version of the bill on June 17, 1964. The House adopted
this version on July 2, 1964, which President Johnson signed into
law the same day.
However, efforts were made to sabotage the bill. For example, it
is generally acknowledged that sex was added as a basis of discrim-
ination by members of Congress opposed to Title VII. This addition
was intended to sabotage the chances of passage of the Title VII
legislation.' 6 This tactic failed, and over the years sex discrimination,
despite the intentions of those original "backers," has become one
of the main areas of employment discrimination litigation.17 Since
their inception, Title VII and the EEOC have been caught between
those seeking a strong law and agency and those who want far less
federal regulation of business affairs.
The enforcement mechanism for Title VII has sparked a great deal
of debate and controversy. As noted above, much of the dispute
arose between those who favored an agency with strong enforcement
power and those who desired a weaker agency emphasizing investi-
gation, reporting, and voluntary compliance. One proposal which
favored a more active agency provided for complaints before an
independent Equal Employment Opportunity Board. The Board would
have had the power to issue cease and desist orders enforceable in
the federal courts of appeals. The compromise reached by Congress
resulted in the EEOC which is a bipartisan commission composed of
five members who are appointed by the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for five year terms. One member is
designated as chair. As created, the EEOC had no enforcement powers
and was only empowered to investigate and seek a voluntary con-
ciliation agreement. If conciliation failed, the individual complainant
could bring a lawsuit in federal district court. The Department of
Justice, at the court's discretion, could seek to intervene in the private
suit. The Attorney General also had authority to bring pattern and
16 See 110 Cong. Rec. pp. 2577-88, 2718-21, 13647, 13663-64 (1964).
'7 In 1978, Title VII was amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub.
L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000 (as amended) (1988)) which
added Section 701(k) to the Act. Subsection (k) defines "sex" as including pregnancy,
childbirth, and related medical conditions.
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practice lawsuits.' The emphasis was clearly on effecting voluntary
compliance with the statute. In 1972, along with other changes, the
EEOC was given the additional authority to litigate Title VII cases,
and the Office of General Counsel was created to carry out this
function. 9 The General Counsel is appointed by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, for a four year term. In most
cases the General Counsel makes a recommendation to the Com-
missioners on whether the Agency should file a lawsuit. If the Com-
missioners vote to approve such action, the General Counsel is
responsible for the litigation. However, suits against state or local
government entities are referred to the United States Department of
Justice. While the emphasis is still on conciliation of cases, litigation
has proven an effective means of accomplishing compliance with the
laws.
Beginning in July of 1979, the EEOC assumed responsibility for
enforcing the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act (EPA). This authority
had previously rested with the Department of Labor but was trans-
ferred to the EEOC pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978.20
Briefly summarized below are the administrative and enforcement
procedures which must be followed in processing Title VII, ADEA,
and EPA cases.
A. Administrative and Enforcement Procedures under Title VII
Title VII cases may be litigated either by the EEOC or by the
private party alleging discrimination. Before any private party can
file a lawsuit charging employment discrimination under Title VII,
he or she must first file a timely charge of discrimination and receive
11 Sections 706 and 707 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 92 Stat. 259-62 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(5) and 42 U.S.C. §
2000 e(6).
19 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3(f)(1),
§ 8(e)(1), 86 Stat. 103, 105-06, 110 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(5)(f)(l) and 42
U.S.C. § 2000 e(4)(b) (1988)). The Commission's authority to bring lawsuits was
proposed by the White House and adopted by Congress after bills giving the EEOC
more extensive powers, similar to the cease and desist powers exercised by the
National Labor Relations Board, were favorably reported by the House Labor
Committee. While the Senate Labor Committee also favorably reported the cease
and desist scheme, the prospect of a long debate caused that Committee to follow
the proposal for EEOC enforcement through lawsuits. The amendments to Title VII
also provided, at the urging of employer representatives, that the period for recovering
back pay be limited to two years prior to the filing of the charge of discrimination.
20 43 Fed. Reg. 19, 807, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. App. at 1155 (1982), 92 Stat.
3781.
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a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC. Then the suit must be filed
in federal district court within 90 days of the notice of Right to Sue.
The processing of most Title VII cases begins with a charge of
discrimination filed by an aggrieved person or by someone on his or
her behalf against an employer, labor organization, joint labor-man-
agement apprenticeship program, or employment agency which em-
ploys 15 or more persons. In a state which does not have a state
and local fair employment practices agency (FEPA) with enforcement
powers, 2' the charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days
of the alleged discriminatory act. In a state which does have a FEPA
with enforcement powers, known as a deferral agency, the charge
must be filed first with the state agency. The state agency has up to
60 days during which time it has exclusive jurisdiction. In these states,
if the state agency does not resolve the charge, the charge must be
filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory
act. Members of the EEOC may also initiate charges against entities
covered by Title VII. In Title VII cases alleging discrimination by a
state or local government agency, the case is forwarded to the United
States Department of Justice which determines whether to initiate
litigation.
Once the EEOC receives a charge, the Agency notifies the entity
charged with discrimination and then undertakes an investigation of
the charge. The EEOC has the power to subpoena both documents
and witnesses during the course of its investigation. Its subpoenas
can be enforced through the federal district courts. If immediate
action is required to preserve evidence or to protect a charging party
from retaliation, the EEOC in appropriate cases may seek a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction pending final resolution
of the charge. The investigators may consult with the EEOC attorneys
throughout the processing of the charge. A charging party may request
21 The EEOC works in conjunction with state and local fair employment practices
agencies (FEPAs). Nationwide, 109 state agencies have been designated as FEPAs.
These agencies administer state and local laws prohibiting employment discrimination
and the enforcement mechanisms for these laws. The EEOC is responsible for
overseeing the work of the FEPAs including making sure that FEPA investigations
meet EEOC standards. Figures from the EEOC between 1983 and 1987 indicate that
on an annual basis the Agency directly processes and is responsible for monitoring
approximately 115,500 charges of discrimination. In fiscal year 1989 alone, the
Agency received 59,411 charges. The EEOC forwarded 3,459 of the charges to the
FEPAs. The Agency received 3,572 charges from the FEPAs. See generally EQuAL.
TimEs, U.S. EEOC, OFFICE OF COMMUNCATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, Jan.
1990.
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the issuance of the Notice of Right to Sue at any time after the
Agency has had a charge for 180 days. The EEOC normally terminates
its investigation of the charge when this occurs but may intervene in
a private lawsuit filed by the complainant upon the complainant's
receipt of the Right to Sue Notice. The charging party of course may
wait to act until the EEOC fully investigates the case and makes its
determination.
Once the EEOC investigation is complete, the investigator to whom
the charge has been assigned makes a recommendation to the local
District Director as to whether reasonable cause exists to believe that
the charge is true. If no cause is found, then the charging party may
appeal this decision to the EEOC's Determination Review Program
(DRP) in the Agency's headquarters office within 14 days. The de-
termination becomes final when no timely appeal is filed or when
the DRP issues a decision upholding the determination. This final
determination is considered the required Notice of Right to Sue.
If a finding of cause is made, the EEOC District Office issues a
Letter of Determination (LOD). After issuance of the LOD, the
respondent is invited to engage in conciliation efforts with the agency.
The EEOC is required to attempt a good faith conciliation of charges
in which cause is found.
Unless a satisfactory conciliation agreement is reached on a "cause"
finding, EEOC attorneys review the case and make a recommendation
to the EEOC as to whether the agency should file suit. The Com-
missioners then vote on whether to authorize litigation. If litigation
is approved, then the case is sent back to the District Office Legal
Unit. At that point, the individual is notified and may intervene in
the Agency's suit.
No statutory or other time limit exists within which the government
must finish its investigation or bring suit. While the doctrine of laches
can be applied to the government's action, the only statutory pre-
requisite to the government's lawsuit, once the government has re-
ceived a charge, is that it must attempt conciliation and it may not
file a lawsuit until it has had the charge for at least 30 days. The
government has the first option of suit which it may lose once it has
had the charge for more than 180 days. In any event, the process
of bringing a charge to court can be a lengthy one. This delay is
one of the main criticisms lodged against the system.
In any Title VII case, if the EEOC or Department of Justice declines
to bring suit on the charge, a Notice of Right to Sue is issued to
the charging party who must then file suit in federal district court
within 90 days. The courts have been strict in requiring that plaintiffs
[Vol. 20:89
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file within the 90 day period. If they do not do so, their rights under
Title VII are lost.
In all Title VII litigation, the charging party is entitled to a trial
de novo in the federal district court. The trial is before a judge
without a jury because, when Title VII was enacted, most juries were
considered hostile to the rights enforced by the statute. Finally,
employees cannot receive compensatory or punitive damages; only
back pay, benefits, and injunctive relief are available.
B. Administrative and Enforcement Procedures under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
The EEOC investigation of an ADEA violation is essentially the
same as its investigation of a Title VII case. Again the emphasis is
on conciliation, but there are three major differences between the
two types of actions. First, ADEA time limits are different. Second,
under ADEA, plaintiffs are entitled to jury trials if the case is litigated.
Finally, ADEA plaintiffs may be awarded liquidated damages upon
a showing of willful discrimination.
The ADEA specifies that a private party may not file suit alleging
violation of the Act until 60 days after he or she has filed a dis-
crimination charge with the EEOC. In a state with no age discrim-
ination law, the charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory act; in a state with an age discrimination law, the
charge must be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice
or within 30 days after notice that the state proceedings have been
terminated, whichever is earlier. Suit must be initiated in federal
district court within two years from the discriminatory act or within
three years in the case of willful violations. These time periods may
be tolled for up to one year while the EEOC is engaged in conciliation
efforts .22
The EEOC may bring an ADEA lawsuit even in cases in which
the aggrieved party does not initiate proceedings by filing a charge.
The only prerequisite to a suit by the government is that the agency
engage in conciliation efforts and that the agency meet the two or
three year statute of limitations. Because of the two year statute of
limitations, age cases must be closely monitored to ensure compliance
with the limits.
22 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602, 605 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2) (1988)).
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C. Administrative and Enforcement Procedures under the Equal
Pay Act
One of the major differences between the EPA and other anti-
discrimination laws is that the EPA provides for private and gov-
ernment initiated lawsuits without requiring administrative charges or
conciliation. The statute of limitations is two years from the alleged
discrimination and three years in cases of willful violation. Generally,
each pay day on which disparate wages are paid because of gender
is considered a violation.
An individual may sue his or her employer directly in federal district
court pursuant to Section 16(B) of the Act; also, he or she may
request that the EEOC seek redress for violation of the Act, or the
EEOC may initiate an EPA action on behalf of an aggrieved party.
Individuals often allege EPA violations in conjunction with Title VII
charges. A government suit precludes private litigation. The EEOC
investigation of EPA cases is essentially similar to its investigation
of Title VII and ADEA cases.
D. Comments
As noted above, employees must exhaust their administrative rem-
edies with the EEOC prior to instituting a lawsuit under Title VII
or ADEA. Some have criticized the time limits and procedures as
posing unnecessary obstacles to employment discrimination victims.
However, employers generally favor strict adherence to the time limits;
they argue that without such limits they would be subject to suit on
old charges where evidence would be unavailable. In addition, an
important feature of the administrative scheme is that employers are
required to post a notice informing employees of their rights. It also
is argued that the required procedures are not that complex. Further,
an aggrieved person may bring a charge without the necessity of a
lawyer. Thus, the individual is spared a great investment of time and
money as the EEOC pursues its investigation and attempts to con-
ciliate. Even if at some point the individual decides to sue on his or
her own, he or she has the benefit of the evidence obtained by the
EEOC. 23 In fact, in cases involving race discrimination, plaintiffs
often join a Title VII claim with a Section 1981 claim and use the
23 This commentary does not include a discussion of the procedures applicable
to cases brought by federal employees, including procedures provided for under
section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act.
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evidence gathered in the EEOC proceeding. Under Section 1981,
plaintiffs may seek punitive damages, and they are not limited by
either short time limits or a requirement of exhausting administrative
remedies. In many instances the employee is made whole at the
administrative stage and can avoid the time and expense of litigation
altogether.
III. IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EEOC
In 1964, when the Civil Rights Act was enacted, Title VII was
certainly not viewed as the most controversial section of the legis-
lation. Most would agree that the Public Accommodations Section
held this distinction. Over the years, however, Title VII has eclipsed
the other titles of the Act and has generated by far the most litigation.
With the enactment of the ADEA in 1967, the EPA in 1963, and
various amendments to Title VII, employment discrimination litigation
has exploded in volume. The impact of this legislation on working
conditions has been dramatic and to a certain extent incalculable.
Yet, in terms of statistics, the following numbers represent some
tangible proof of the Agency's impact. Since 1982, the EEOC has
secured approximately $907 million for victims of discrimination, 24
not to mention the broad injunctive relief obtained or the educational
and preventive measures effectuated. During fiscal year 1989, the
EEOC filed 599 direct lawsuits and interventions and resolved 558
lawsuits. By the third quarter of 1989 alone, the EEOC recovered
$26.1 million on behalf of victims of discrimination through court
litigation. 25 Monetary benefits obtained through conciliation by mid-
fiscal year 1989 totalled $52.7 million. 26
These statistics are even more significant when one considers that
a large number of the individuals helped by the EEOC have no other
forum or have a less effective forum available to them. For example,
only about 16.407o of the United States wage and salaried workforce
is unionized and covered by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)
which may contain provisions on discrimination and provide for
binding arbitration. 27 Also, many of the issues covered by the anti-
24 EQUAL TIMES, U.S. EEOC, OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE AF-
FAIRS, Apr. 1989.
25 EQUAL TnMEs, U.S. EEOC, OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE AF-
FAIRS, Jan. 1990.
26 EQUAL TIMEs, U.S. EEOC, OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE AF-
FAIRS, Sept. 1989.
11 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at B8 (Feb. 8, 1990).
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discrimination laws are ones that arise before a CBA comes into
play, such as discriminatory recruitment and hiring practices.
Moreover, even those employees who are unionized and are covered
by a CBA and those managers and executives who have individual
employment contracts with arbitration provisions may be better served
by the EEOC processes. This observation is based on both the pro-
cedural advantages of the EEOC processes and the public policy and
purpose underlying the anti-discrimination statutes.
The United States Supreme Court, while discussing the Fair Labor
Standards Act in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,28
observed that "[n]ot all disputes between an employee and his em-
ployer are suited for bindirig resolution in accordance with the pro-
cedures established by collective bargaining" and further stated that
"different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based
on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum
substantive guarantees to individual workers.' '29 It is widely argued
that because of the common factors behind the purpose and policies
of the anti-discrimination legislation the Court's observations in Bar-
rentine have direct application to the anti-discrimination statutes and
to all employees whether covered by a CBA, an individual employment
contract, or neither. In fact, the courts generally have refused to
defer discrimination cases because of agreements to arbitrate such
claims or because of the facts giving rise to the dispute.30
IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
PROCESS OVER ARBITRATION IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
Congress designed the anti-discrimination legislation to be overseen
and enforced by a public agency with final enforcement responsibility,
namely, the EEOC. The responsibility of the EEOC to eliminate
discrimination is far broader than the responsibility of an arbitrator
to construe a particular contract and resolve only the issue presented.
28 450 U.S. 728 (1981). The Court held that § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act gave employees a right to bring their claims to court and that such claims are
not waiveable by an agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 745.
29 Id. at 737.
30 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the United States
Supreme Court was very critical of the ability of the arbitration process to handle
statutory issues and ruled that arbitration agreements and decisions do not foreclose
access to the EEOC or courts to resolve a Title VII claim. In Nicholson v. CPC
International Inc., 887 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit reached a similar
ruling in an ADEA case.
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The EEOC has authority not only to resolve the individual charge
before it, but also in many cases it may use the charge to investigate
and to eliminate other discriminatory actions and practices by the
employer. Alternative procedures such as an individual's reliance on
the more limited arbitration process can undermine the statutory
scheme of the anti-discrimination legislation designed to eliminate not
simply individual complaints but discrimination in the entire work-
place. Moreover, arbitration often proves to be an unsatisfactory
forum in which to resolve issues of discrimination because of the
inherent policy and procedural differences it has with EEOC en-
forcement. An employee who files a charge with the EEOC, as noted
above, need not expend any of his or her own money or time. He
or she is provided with an investigator who has subpoena power and
access to a legal staff which can investigate the charge. In the ar-
bitration forum, on the other hand, the employee may be dependant
on the efforts of a union which does not have interests identical to
those of the individual. The union must serve the interests of the
union as a whole, which may be at odds with those of the individual.
In addition, most arbitration procedures do not provide for the broad
discovery/investigative powers possessed by the EEOC; nor is court-
enforced subpoena power available to back up information requests
in many arbitration forums.
Partly because one of the primary functions of arbitration is to
insure industrial peace and to avoid strikes, arbitrators often com-
promise the case before them and tend to avoid findings of intentional
wrongdoing. This tendency of arbitration rulings to represent a com-
promise often precludes giving full relief to individuals asserting
discrimination claims. For example, a disparate treatment claim by
an individual under Title VII or the ADEA requires a finding of
discriminatory intent, and a sexual harassment claim under Title VII
often mandates the discipline or discharge of a valued employee who
is found to have harassed co-workers or subordinates. Such findings
and remedies may be difficult for an arbitrator to order.
Also, discrimination claims often involve difficult issues, the res-
olution of which will impact cases and employment practices other
than the one at hand. Not only are most arbitrators prevented by
the contract from expanding the scope of the case, they do not have
to apply external law. They are able to make compromises virtually
free from scrutiny. Judicial review of arbitration decisions is extremely
narrow and does not involve the merits of the dispute. The decision
will not be overturned because of a mistake of law or fact as long
1990]
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as it draws its "essence" from the contract." The significance of
there being, as a practical matter, no appeal from an arbitration
decision is further underscored in that some of the most important
discrimination law has been developed on appeal.32 Another significant
point is that even though the EEOC process is independent and court
review of the case is de novo, arbitration decisions are generally
admissible as evidence before the EEOC and in court." This may
cause individuals and/or unions to withdraw intentionally a discrim-
ination issue from an arbitrator for fear that it will not be dealt with
adequately and will then impact negatively on a future EEOC or
court decision.
Finally, the remedies available through the EEOC/court process
are far greater than those afforded by the arbitration process. Em-
ployees who pursue their rights through the EEOC are afforded the
collection of damages to make them whole and injunctive relief
provided by anti-discrimination legislation, as well as often helpful
procedural tools, such as the class action, which are not available
under most arbitration procedures. In ADEA cases, employees may
even obtain liquidated damages if the discrimination is proven to be
willful.
V. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE EEOC AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
The EEOC has carried a heavy burden on an ever-shrinking budget.
It has done so remarkably well. The system does have problems
meeting the ever-increasing demand for its services, and the federal
court system has seen a 2,166%0 increase in employment discrimination
cases filed over the past 20 years.
To relieve the burden on the courts, the Federal Courts Study
Committee (FCSC) issued a draft report which is part of a Con-
gressionally mandated report on the reform of the federal court
system. This draft report recommends that the EEOC assume a quasi-
judicial role in resolving wrongful discharge claims. This proposal is
1, United Steelworkers of America v. America Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
32 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment
decision setting forth both quid pro quo and hostile environment theories).
11 As to evidence admitted in court, the judge accords to the evidence the weight
he or she deems appropriate.
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fairly similar to those included in the original bill submitted to
Congress in 1963 and in the amendments suggested in 1972. Under
the proposal, Title VII would be amended and for a five year ex-
perimental period the EEOC could adjudicate such claims. Charging
parties would be able to choose between going to the agency or to
federal district court. In either case, a right of appeal would exist
to the federal court of appeals. The NLRB procedures would serve
as a guide for such proceedings. Employers are generally opposed to
this proposal.3 4 An alternative to added EEOC participation in re-
-solving employment discrimination cases would be some type of
dispute resolution system under the aegis of the district court. 35 The
draft report will be the subject of public hearings, and a final report
will be presented to Congress, the Chief Justice, and the President.
The EEOC has expressed doubt as to whether it has the ability
under its present structure to assume a quasi-judicial role as proposed
by the Draft Report. The Agency has also pointed out that it likely
will be assuming significant new responsibilities under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The EEOC has suggested that the FCSC consider
the proposal for alternative dispute resolution under federal court
supervision for wrongful discharge claims.3 6
Also pending are proposals to amend Title VII to provide for
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrim-
ination, and to allow jury trials. This latter proposal is said to be
prompted by perceived pro-employer bias of the federal judiciary.
Juries are now seen to be more sympathetic to Title VII claimants
than are the judges. These proposals are part of the pending Civil
Rights Act of 199037 which was drawn up primarily in response to
several 1989 Supreme Court decisions widely perceived to cut back
on the rights of plaintiffs in discrimination cases.18 These legislative
efforts to amend and expand Title VII have met with stiff opposition.3 9
Regardless of the outcome of the Federal Court Study Committee
reports and the proposed amendments to Title VII, the importance
of the anti-discrimination statutes and the often difficult questions
14 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A5-A6 (Feb. 16, 1990).
35 Id.
36 Id.
17 S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990). H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1990).
31 Id.; Lab. L. Rep. (CCH), at 1 (Feb. 19, 1990).
19 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at Al0-All (Feb. 28, 1990).
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which arise under them mandate that these statutes be given priority
in our federal judicial system.
